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Supply Chain Security ​

AeroFTP protects the software update pipeline with cryptographic verification at multiple points, ensuring that users only install artifacts built by the official CI/CD pipeline.

Sigstore Signing ​

Every release artifact is signed using Sigstore Cosign with GitHub Actions OIDC keyless signing:

PropertyDetail
Signing toolCosign v3.0.6, the default of sigstore/cosign-installer pinned to 6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 (installer v4.1.2). build.yml does not override that default
IdentityGitHub Actions workflow (build.yml) bound to the release tag
OIDC issuerhttps://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Bundle format.sigstore.json (Sigstore bundle v0.3)
Signed artifacts.deb, .rpm, .AppImage, .snap, .msi, .exe, .dmg

No private keys are stored as secrets. The signing identity is derived from the GitHub OIDC token issued to the CI workflow at build time.

Client-Side Verification ​

The desktop app verifies Sigstore bundles before installing any update:

text
1. check_update()         →  Query GitHub Releases API for new version
2. download_update()      →  Download artifact + .sigstore.json bundle
3. verify_sigstore_bundle →  Verify bundle against GitHub OIDC identity + workflow tag
4. On failure             →  Delete both files, show error
5. On success             →  Proceed to installation

Verification uses the sigstore Rust crate (0.14.0 on main at aa0e477, 5 November 2026) with the production trust root. A bundle that does not verify is VerificationFailed: the caller deletes the artifact and the bundle and does not install. The identity is pinned to the exact workflow file and release tag:

https://github.com/axpdev-lab/aeroftp/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/tags/v{VERSION}

{VERSION} is the release number, so the tag is v{VERSION}, as in v4.2.7. The updater appends the GitHub release tag, which already includes that v. An artifact signed by a different workflow, a different repository, or a fork will be rejected.

Linux Privileged Install Hardening ​

On Linux, .deb and .rpm updates are installed via pkexec with a custom Polkit policy. The update helper (/usr/lib/aeroftp/aeroftp-update-helper) adds a second verification layer:

  1. The backend computes SHA-256 of the Sigstore-verified artifact
  2. The hash is passed as an argument to the helper alongside the file path
  3. The helper copies the file to a stable location, recomputes SHA-256, and compares
  4. Installation proceeds only if the hashes match

This eliminates TOCTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) attacks where the file could be replaced between verification and privileged installation.

Verification for Users ​

Users can independently verify any release artifact using Cosign:

bash
VERSION=4.2.7
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle "AeroFTP_${VERSION}_amd64.deb.sigstore.json" \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/axpdev-lab/aeroftp/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/tags/v${VERSION}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "AeroFTP_${VERSION}_amd64.deb"

VERSION is the release number, as in the repository README. The identity is the build.yml workflow at that tag. A signature from another workflow or another ref does not match.

Plugin Registry ​

The remote plugin registry is currently disabled until client-side cryptographic verification of registry content is implemented. Locally installed plugins continue to function. This is a deliberate fail-closed decision: the previous registry model provided integrity (SHA-256) but not authenticity, since both the download URL and the hash came from the same unauthenticated source.

CI/CD Security ​

ControlDetail
GitHub Actions SHA pinningThird-party actions in the workflows are pinned to commit SHAs
cargo audit.github/workflows/checks.yml runs cargo audit --deny warnings on every pull request, every push to main, and every Monday at 06:00 UTC. On a pull request the whole step is non-blocking, including a registry failure, a tool failure, and an audit warning. A push to main and the weekly run fail the job
DependabotWeekly pull requests, opened on Monday, for Cargo under src-tauri, for npm, and for GitHub Actions
Security regression script.github/scripts/security-regression.cjs runs in the local pre-push gate. It is not a step in checks.yml or build.yml
OIDC permissionsid-token: write is set on the release jobs in build.yml. The Cosign steps that sign artifacts run on tag publication. checks.yml does not request that permission
CodeRabbitReviews the diff of pull requests on axpdev-lab/aeroftp and on axpdev-lab/docs.aeroftp.app. A passing check is a review of that change. It is not a scan of RustSec, OSV, or the npm advisory database
GreptileSame role, on the same two repositories. A passing check is not a vulnerability scan and is not a dated audit report
Snyk and SocketPull-request checks on axpdev-lab/aeroftp. Snyk looks at dependency manifests. Socket posts pull-request alerts and a project report. Both were passing on the merge of #1507. They are per-commit checks

The self-hosted advisory pipeline is Continuous Audit. A CodeRabbit or Greptile comment is a finding on that pull request's diff.

aeroftp.app - Released under the GPL-3.0 License. AeroFTP Reviews