Supply Chain Security
AeroFTP protects the software update pipeline with cryptographic verification at multiple points, ensuring that users only install artifacts built by the official CI/CD pipeline.
Sigstore Signing
Every release artifact is signed using Sigstore Cosign with GitHub Actions OIDC keyless signing:
| Property | Detail |
|---|---|
| Signing tool | Cosign v3.0.6, the default of sigstore/cosign-installer pinned to 6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 (installer v4.1.2). build.yml does not override that default |
| Identity | GitHub Actions workflow (build.yml) bound to the release tag |
| OIDC issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Bundle format | .sigstore.json (Sigstore bundle v0.3) |
| Signed artifacts | .deb, .rpm, .AppImage, .snap, .msi, .exe, .dmg |
No private keys are stored as secrets. The signing identity is derived from the GitHub OIDC token issued to the CI workflow at build time.
Client-Side Verification
The desktop app verifies Sigstore bundles before installing any update:
1. check_update() → Query GitHub Releases API for new version
2. download_update() → Download artifact + .sigstore.json bundle
3. verify_sigstore_bundle → Verify bundle against GitHub OIDC identity + workflow tag
4. On failure → Delete both files, show error
5. On success → Proceed to installationVerification uses the sigstore Rust crate (0.14.0 on main at aa0e477, 5 November 2026) with the production trust root. A bundle that does not verify is VerificationFailed: the caller deletes the artifact and the bundle and does not install. The identity is pinned to the exact workflow file and release tag:
https://github.com/axpdev-lab/aeroftp/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/tags/v{VERSION}{VERSION} is the release number, so the tag is v{VERSION}, as in v4.2.7. The updater appends the GitHub release tag, which already includes that v. An artifact signed by a different workflow, a different repository, or a fork will be rejected.
Linux Privileged Install Hardening
On Linux, .deb and .rpm updates are installed via pkexec with a custom Polkit policy. The update helper (/usr/lib/aeroftp/aeroftp-update-helper) adds a second verification layer:
- The backend computes SHA-256 of the Sigstore-verified artifact
- The hash is passed as an argument to the helper alongside the file path
- The helper copies the file to a stable location, recomputes SHA-256, and compares
- Installation proceeds only if the hashes match
This eliminates TOCTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) attacks where the file could be replaced between verification and privileged installation.
Verification for Users
Users can independently verify any release artifact using Cosign:
VERSION=4.2.7
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle "AeroFTP_${VERSION}_amd64.deb.sigstore.json" \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/axpdev-lab/aeroftp/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/tags/v${VERSION}" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
"AeroFTP_${VERSION}_amd64.deb"VERSION is the release number, as in the repository README. The identity is the build.yml workflow at that tag. A signature from another workflow or another ref does not match.
Plugin Registry
The remote plugin registry is currently disabled until client-side cryptographic verification of registry content is implemented. Locally installed plugins continue to function. This is a deliberate fail-closed decision: the previous registry model provided integrity (SHA-256) but not authenticity, since both the download URL and the hash came from the same unauthenticated source.
CI/CD Security
| Control | Detail |
|---|---|
| GitHub Actions SHA pinning | Third-party actions in the workflows are pinned to commit SHAs |
cargo audit | .github/workflows/checks.yml runs cargo audit --deny warnings on every pull request, every push to main, and every Monday at 06:00 UTC. On a pull request the whole step is non-blocking, including a registry failure, a tool failure, and an audit warning. A push to main and the weekly run fail the job |
| Dependabot | Weekly pull requests, opened on Monday, for Cargo under src-tauri, for npm, and for GitHub Actions |
| Security regression script | .github/scripts/security-regression.cjs runs in the local pre-push gate. It is not a step in checks.yml or build.yml |
| OIDC permissions | id-token: write is set on the release jobs in build.yml. The Cosign steps that sign artifacts run on tag publication. checks.yml does not request that permission |
| CodeRabbit | Reviews the diff of pull requests on axpdev-lab/aeroftp and on axpdev-lab/docs.aeroftp.app. A passing check is a review of that change. It is not a scan of RustSec, OSV, or the npm advisory database |
| Greptile | Same role, on the same two repositories. A passing check is not a vulnerability scan and is not a dated audit report |
| Snyk and Socket | Pull-request checks on axpdev-lab/aeroftp. Snyk looks at dependency manifests. Socket posts pull-request alerts and a project report. Both were passing on the merge of #1507. They are per-commit checks |
The self-hosted advisory pipeline is Continuous Audit. A CodeRabbit or Greptile comment is a finding on that pull request's diff.